



COMPENSATION AS MORAL REPAIR AND AS MORAL 
JUSTIFICATION FOR RISKS 
A COMPENSAÇÃO COMO REPARAÇÃO MORAL E COMO 




Abstract. Can compensation repair the moral harm of a previous wrongful act? 
On the one hand, some define the very function of compensation as one of restoring 
the moral balance. On the other hand, the dominant view on compensation is that 
it is insufficient to fully repair moral harm unless accompanied by an act of 
punishment or apology. In this paper, I seek to investigate the maximal potential 
of compensation. Central to my argument is a distinction between apologetic 
compensation and non-apologetic compensation. Apologetic compensation, I 
argue, is an act that expresses regret and apology by means of some offer of money, 
goods, or services. Non-apologetic compensation is an act that seeks to restore loss 
or harm without expressing regret or apology. In the paper, I defend the view that 
acts of compensation can be apologetic and argue that such apologetic 
compensation is sufficient for moral repair. 
Keywords: compensation, apologies, reparations, restitution, moral repair. 
Sumário. Será a compensação capaz de reparar o dano moral causado por um 
acto errado anterior? Por um lado, há quem defina a função da reparação como 
reposição do equilíbrio moral. Por outro, a perspectiva dominante acerca da 
compensação considera que esta é insuficiente para reparar totalmente o dano 
moral a não ser que seja acompanhada de um acto de castigo ou de um pedido de 
desculpas. Neste artigo procuro investigar o potencial máximo da compensação. 
Uma distinção entre compensação apologética e compensação não apologética é 
central para o meu argumento. A compensação apologética é um acto que exprime 
arrependimento e um pedido de desculpas através de uma oferta de dinheiro, bens 
ou serviços. A compensação não apologética é um acto que procura restaurar a 
perda ou dano sem exprimir arrependimento ou um pedido de desculpas. Neste 
artigo, defendo a perspectiva segundo a qual os actos de compensação podem ser 
apologéticos e argumento que uma compensação apologética deste tipo é suficiente 
para a reparação moral. 
Palavras-chave: compensação, pedidos de desculpas, reparações, restituição, 
reparação moral. 
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In this paper, I am interested in whether something we might refer to as the 
strong compensation claim can be defended. This is the claim that full 
compensation is sufficient to right wrongs and to fully restore the moral situation 
for the victim such that it would be as if the original harm had never occurred. 
Feinberg, for instance, writes that compensation “functions not only to repair the 
damages but also to ‘restore the moral equilibrium,’ as would an apology or 
expression of remorse” (Feinberg, 1970a, p.74). The strong compensation claim 
is perhaps expressed most clearly by Goodin: “From a moral point of view, the 
function of compensation is straightforward. Compensation serves to right what 
would otherwise count as wrongful injuries to persons or their property” (Goodin, 
1991, p.257). Contrast this with the weak compensation claim: that, given a 
previous wrong, compensation can repair the harm but not fully restore the moral 
balance. Gaus (1991), for example, argues that compensation can only restore 
moral imbalances in those cases where the right’s infringement was justified in 
the first place. The standard view of the repairing qualities of compensation is 
much closer to the weak claim than to the strong claim. It is often argued that 
compensation cannot address moral wrongs at all, but merely losses; or that 
compensation, though it contributes to righting wrongs, does so to a lesser degree 
than apologies or punishments do. Roberts (2002), for example, suggests that 
compensation must be accompanied by an apology in order to right a wrong. 
Griseri (1985, p.402) suggests that compensation is often demanded in lieu of 
complete annulment, that is, when things cannot be made fully right.  
What would be required of an act of compensation in order for it to fully 
rectify a wrong? There are three distinct positions about what it would require to 
morally repair a wrong via compensation: 1) Moral reparation requires only 
reparation of harm (the wrong consists in nothing but the harm); 2) Moral 
reparation requires reparation of wrong (where the wrong is distinct from the 
harm); 3) Moral reparation requires reparation of both harm and wrong (where 
these are distinct). I shall argue position 2 is the most reasonable one. Position 1 
rests on the assumption that the wrong of an action consists in nothing but the 
harm. This seems reasonable enough as a utilitarian assumption but seems 
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insufficient on any non-consequentialist account. Position 3 might seem 
preferable to 2 in that it covers both harm and wrong. However, in many cases 
the reparation of harm may not be possible or necessary in order to right the 
wrong. The position argued for in this paper is that full repair requires 
compensation such that the right kind of meaning of repair and regret is 
conveyed. I will argue that, if we assume an expressive interpretation of moral 
wrongdoings and formulate an equivalent expressive conception of 
compensation, then there is a case for the strong compensation claim. When 
compensation fails to be expressive in the right way, compensation cannot fully 
repair moral damage on its own.  
 In this paper, I focus on three clusters of problems divided over five 
sections. The first problem (sections 1-2) consists in finding a plausible account 
of compensation that could explain how wrongs could be righted. The second 
problem (section 3) is to work out the finer details of apologetic compensation: 
what makes a particular act of compensation successful in communicating regret 
and re-writing the message of the wrongful act? The third problem (sections 4-5) 
takes us back to the main question: is apologetic compensation sufficient to right 
a wrong, and can the strong compensation claim be defended? In the last section 
(5) I briefly apply this to the moral problem of risk impositions. 
1.0. The Indifference Criterion. 
Is there an account of compensation that could make the strong 
compensation claim convincing? According to Nozick, full compensation is 
provided when the victim is on the same indifference curve as they were before 
the harm occurred.  
Something fully compensates a person for a loss if and only if it makes him 
no worse off than he otherwise would have been; it compensates person X for 
person Y’s action A if X is no worse off receiving it, Y having done A, than X would 
have been without receiving it if Y had not done A. (Nozick, 2006, p.57) 
 
This means that I could be compensated in a number of ways, as long as I 
am indifferent between being harmed but compensated and not being harmed. 
Compensation is achieved by making the victim “as well off” as they would have 
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been had the original incident not occurred. The basic idea of the indifference 
criterion seems to appeal to one of two rather different intuitions and lines of 
reasoning. Let us refer to them as the “no worse off” and the “would not mind” 
readings of the indifference criterion. 
1.1. “No Worse Off.” 
The “no worse off” reading says little more than that full compensation 
requires that the person harmed ought to be compensated in such a way that they 
are “no worse off” than if they had not been harmed. This accords with Goodin’s 
account. For him, to compensate someone is to provide “a full and perfect 
equivalent” for what was lost or harmed (Goodin, 1991, p.262). Essentially, the 
loss of a means to a valued end is compensated for when some equally good 
means to the same end is offered. When such an equivalence is not possible, full 
compensation would require providing means to a different end that still makes 
the person as well off as they would otherwise have been. The point is that it is 
the fact that an act of compensation makes the victim as well off that gives it its 
reparative properties. Goodin’s account of compensation is, thus, one of a return 
to the previous status quo ante, a return, as far as possible, to the way things were 
before the loss or damage, either by offering similar means to the same end or by 
offering means to a different but equally valuable end (see, e.g., Chapman, 1995, 
p.409). Central to this account is the proportionality between loss and 
compensation (see, e.g., Corlett, 2002, p.148). A is a perfect equivalent for B if A 
is neither more nor less than B and if A restores the compensated person to the 
same baseline of wellbeing as before the original loss of A.  
To compensate someone for something is…to provide that person with ‘a 
full and perfect equivalent for that thing’. If he is given more than that, we would 
say that he has been ‘over-compensated’; if less, ‘under-compensated’. Being 
bracketed as it is in between these other two notions, the notion of compensation 
per se clearly implies the providing of the exact equivalent – neither more nor 
less. (Goodin, 1991, p.262)  
 
Could the “no worse off” version of full compensation make a convincing 
reading of the strong compensation claim? The idea that compensation can right 
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a wrong by making the victim “no worse off” only makes sense if the person 
suffered a loss in wellbeing (on some measure) as a result of the wronging act 
and that they would have been better off in terms of wellbeing had they not been 
so wronged. A wronging act need not, however, lead to a loss in wellbeing. It could 
be a case of “harmless wrongdoing” (Ripstein, 2006). Such cases of wrong could 
not be repaired morally via compensation since there was no loss in wellbeing to 
compensate for. More worrying are cases of wrongful harms that seriously harm 
the victim but that also lead to an increase in wellbeing overall (for the victim). In 
such cases, where the harmed and wronged person is made as well off, or better 
off, by the resulting set of events, it would not be possible to right the wrong by 
making the person “as well off”. The problem stems from the fact that wellbeing, 
as a measure, tends to be aggregative when applied to one and the same person. 
Furthermore, serious rights violations (that do not leave the person as well off) 
could be made right by simply making that person better off (in some respect). 
Such cases would allow for exploitations of those who are already vulnerable. If 
someone lacks basic needs, then providing those needs seems to make the person 
better off even if they are exploited. We do not want to say that if the victim is 
poor enough then one can do whatever one wants to them as long as their 
education is paid for, food is bought, shelter is provided, etc. To sum up, the “no 
worse off” version of successful compensation rests on the assumption that a 
wrong is put right because the resulting loss is repaid. But this leaves the moral 
wrong, over and above the harm done, basically unaddressed. 
However, this objection only holds if we read the indifference criterion as a 
return to status quo criterion and view wellbeing as an aggregative measure. 
Although Goodin does suggest “a return to the same baseline of wellbeing” as a 
criterion, that is primarily in the context of valued ends, and he favours 
compensation in the form of replacing means lost with some perfect equivalent 
means to the same end. Furthermore, he does not argue that compensation is 
sufficient to right wrongs in all cases. Nonetheless, the “no worse off” criterion 
seems to only support the strong compensation claim if we assume the first 
position mentioned in the introduction: that it is sufficient to only repair the 
damages in order to right the wrong. Nozick partly avoids this worry by making 
indifference the righting criterion since a person in such a case would not be 
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indifferent between being wronged and not being wronged. This brings us to the 
“would not mind” version of full compensation. 
1.2. “Would Not Mind.” 
In the second reading of the indifference criterion, preferences seem to 
provide something of an equivalent to consent, expressing the will of the person 
subjected to the harm or loss. The argument goes something like this: 
1. Person X is indifferent between i) no harm and ii) harm and compensation. 
2. If person X is indifferent between i) no harm and ii) harm and 
compensation, then person X does not mind ii) harm and compensation. 
3. From (1) and (2): Person X does not mind ii). 
4. If person X does not mind ii), then ii) is permissible.  
5. It is permissible for Y to harm X if Y fully compensates X (i.e., option ii). 
The initial problem is how to make sense of premise 1. What does it mean 
to say that X is indifferent between “no harm” and “harm and compensation”? 
Nozick admits: “Shamelessly, I ignore general problems about the counterfactual 
‘as well off (on as high an indifference curve) as X would have been if Y’s action 
hadn’t occurred’” (Nozick, 2006, p.57).  
The most problematic step in the above argument is the one from “would 
not mind” to moral permissibility (that is, premise 4). What is it in “X would not 
mind being harmed and compensated” that could make harmful action morally 
permissible? I think we have a general tendency to think that if X “would not 
mind” then they would also consent to it (if asked). This seems to be what it means 
in everyday language. When leaving the house in the pouring rain, we might take 
our partner’s umbrella knowing that they “would not mind”. The reason for this, 
perhaps, is that we know that they have no issues about lending things or have 
done so willingly in the past.  
 On what grounds can Y presume that X would consent to be harmed if 
compensated? First, we can look at it “materialistically”, as in the “no worse off” 
argument. If the situation is objectively as good as before, then they have no 
reason not to consent to it. Consent is then presumed by some reference to what 
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is rational for X to consent to in an impersonal way, which might miss quite a few 
aspects that X takes into account but Y does not. Secondly, we can consider the 
actual preferences of X and conclude that, given those preferences, they ought to 
consent to A because they would prefer A. Thirdly, we can consider the 
preferences of a larger group, and, presuming that X’s preferences are the same 
as those of that group, conclude that, given the preferences of that group, they 
are likely to consent to A. I will address the first two in turn. The third will not be 
addressed separately since it is merely a weaker form of the second option.  
 What about the first idea that, given that the person is “no worse off”, they 
have no reason not to consent? This idea relies on an objective comparison of 
states of affairs and a judgment that they are equally good for X. The assumption 
is that if they are equally good then there is no reason to prefer one to the other. 
This might be right if the two states were precisely equally good on all relevant 
measures. However, usually such claims are based on more narrow measures that 
take some aspects into account and not others (as in the case of cost–benefit 
analysis, for example). If so, then there could always be extra reasons to prefer 
one to the other. Even between two states that are equally good in all respects, if 
one is current and the other is not, this could provide grounds to prefer one to the 
other, depending on whether the person prefers change or actual values. Thus, if 
we assume status quo bias (Samuelsson and Zeckhauser, 1988) or a conservative 
preference of existing value (Cohen, 2012), the victim could have reasons not to 
be indifferent between two otherwise equal states. (Furthermore, if harm and 
compensation were to improve the situation for the victim compared to not 
having been harmed at all, this would—besides being a case of  “over 
compensation”—open up to the same kind of concerns about exploitation that I 
raised against the “no worse” off reading.) 
I shall argue that, even if we had perfect knowledge about the preferences of 
X, this would not constitute sufficient grounds for inferring their consent. There 
are several problems with the “would not mind” argument if understood as 
inferred consent from preferences. First, consent is a form of permission given 
before the violation has occurred. But if what makes the violation permissible is 
an indifference between compensated harm and no harm, it is hard to see how 
there could be an indifference between the two that the violator could know of 
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before the harm (and compensation) has occurred. My point is that “indifference” 
is a particularly tricky sort of preference to infer because it is a comparative 
judgement over two states that cannot both be instantiated at the same time.  
Secondly, preferences might be very weak and reflect an almost arbitrary 
preference in any given moment, or else they might have been swayed and 
influenced by biased and/or insufficient information. Suppose that a voter can 
choose between two candidates, P and Q. However, at a particular point in time, 
she has only informed herself about the policies of candidate P and not yet those 
of Q. Being swayed by P’s policies, she might at that point in time prefer P. This 
does not make it right for us to take away her right to vote and, on the grounds of 
her preference for P over Q, infer her consent to P. The problem, as I see it, is that 
inferred consent robs the agents of the choice to decide when they are sufficiently 
informed to consent and when to postpone a decision. Presumed consent has 
replaced consent proper.1  
The indifference criterion is helpful in that it takes into greater account the 
victim and their subjective experience of harm and compensation. But much of 
that is greatly weakened if the person is not consulted at all, and her preferences 
are inferred from an average understanding of which preferences she rationally 
ought to have or which preferences she is most likely to have from a sociological 
point of view, when in fact none of these might reflect their actual preferences. It 
seems, then, that compensation, if based on a hypothetical indifference, gives too 
much liberty to the violator to both harm the victim and to determine when they 
think this violation has been compensated for.  
1.3. Harms and wrongs. 
There are two related objections that could be raised against both versions 
of the indifference account. The first objection is that although the harm might 
be repaired, the wrong is ignored. This objection presumes a distinction between 
                                                   
1 Railton makes a similar point against Nozick’s idea of compensation as a way to legitimise risk impositions without consent. Railton 
writes about the victim saying that there is a “preemption of his actual will and of his sovereignty, his entitlement to decide certain 
matters himself.” See Railton (1985, p.115). The point I am making above is that this same objection can also apply to cases where 
the preferences at a particular time are known. 
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the harm2 of a rights violation (the loss of a piece of stolen property, the bruises 
from a physical attack, etc.) and the wrong of a rights violation (the violation of 
the right not to be stolen from, harmed, etc.). Olsson steals Anderson’s bicycle. In 
doing so, he does two things to Anderson: he causes a loss of his bicycle, and he 
wrongs him in violating his right to his bike. The loss could have occurred in other 
ways than through a crime. Replacing the bicycle with a new one would replace 
the loss, but not the theft. This view of compensation treats thefts no differently 
from losses, and, therefore, cannot claim to be a theory of moral compensation.  
 The second objection is related to the first. If it is sufficient to compensate 
another in contexts of indifference, then the very same wronging act could be 
repeated as long as it is compensated for. The wrongdoer might keep violating the 
rights of another but be ready to compensate for the act each time. Moral 
impermissibility is basically reduced to a transaction cost. Or, as Railton puts it 
in his critique of Nozick’s idea of compensation as legitimising risk impositions: 
“compensation is nothing but a price attached to the pursuit of one’s own ends” 
(Railton, 1985, p.115). We could imagine a bully that routinely violates the rights 
of another but also fully compensates them each time. In such a case, these 
exchanges of compensations seem less to communicate a wish to restore violated 
rights than an acceptance of a price for violating them and a lack of respect for 
them. 
It might be the case that the “would not mind” version fares slightly better 
against this objection. It could perhaps be argued that a particular individual’s 
indifference would eventually wear off; that, after a number of compensated 
trespasses, indifference could no longer be achieved and such trespasses would 
need to stop. However, it could just as well be argued the other way around. 
Radzik (2004, p.147), for example, suggests that being wronged can cause the 
victim to doubt their value. If a victim can come to doubt their own value, then 
they might not be in a position to decide when compensation is sufficient. This is 
particularly worrying if the harm is repeated (even if compensated for). They 
might, as a result, lower their expectations of compensation and thereby lower 
                                                   
2 “Material harm” is here intended to make it clear that I have negative physical changes in mind. I am referring to damages, injuries, 
losses, and the like, and not to more abstract ideas of harm such as “set-back to interests” or the like. 
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the “cost” of harming them. In other words, there is a risk that they might “not 
mind” a lower and lower level of compensation.  
2. The negation criterion.  
The main problem with the above accounts is that they fail to deal with the 
wrongfulness of the previous action. This is a general complaint often directed 
against compensation as a means to make amends (see, e.g., Marshall, 2001; 
Roberts, 2002). The question is whether accounts such as those discussed above 
exhaust the possibilities. According to the strong compensation claim, 
compensation can put right what would otherwise be held as a wrongful act. But 
restoring the damage done, or returning the victim to the same level of wellbeing 
as before, or even making them indifferent to the harm done, is insufficient to 
achieve this. If the strong compensation claim holds, then we need to say 
something rather Hegelian in nature: that the wrongful act can be annulled or 
negated in a way that not only restores the material harm but also restores the 
rights of the victims. This point has, however, mostly been addressed with regards 
to theories of punishment and not of compensation (see, e.g., Griseri, 1985). I will 
refer to this idea as the negation criterion of compensation: compensation rights 
a wrong when it negates that wrong. 
2.1 Actions as Expressive of Meaning. 
The negation criterion presumes that actions convey meaning, and 
Hampton suggests that all actions carry conventionally understood meanings 
that are accessible to all (Hampton, 2007, pp.118-120; see also Murphy, 1988, 
p.25). Following this idea, we have a different analysis of wrongdoing: the 
problem lies in what is expressed in the wrongful act. According to Hampton: “It 
is because behavior can carry meaning with regard to human value that it can be 
wrongful” (Hampton, 2007, p.119). Hegel expressed a similar thought: “His [the 
criminal’s] action is the action of a rational being and this implies that it is 
something universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid down a law which 
he has explicitly recognized in his action…” (Hegel, 1973, p.70, §100). In contrast 
to the accounts discussed above, the violation of rights of another does not consist 
in merely harming another but also in making a statement about the 
permissibility to do so. It is this message that is negated by the state in doling out 
punishment according to expressive theories about punishment. In Hampton’s 
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version, the criminal makes out that they have greater moral worth than they, in 
fact, do, and that the victim has lower moral worth than they, in fact, have.  
A person behaves wrongfully in a way that effects a moral injury to another when she 
treats that person in a way that is precluded by that person’s value, and/or by 
representing him as worth far less that his actual value; or, in other words, when the 
meaning of her action is such that she diminishes him, and by doing so, represents 
herself as elevated with respect to him, thereby according herself a value that she 
does not have. (Hampton, 2007, p.126) 
A similar testimonial idea is expressed by Radzik:  
The wrongful act functions as a kind of testimony that this sort of treatment of the 
victim is acceptable. If the victim believes the testimony, if any spectators to the 
wrong believe it, or if the wrongdoer himself is encouraged by the apparent 
acceptance of his claim to superiority, then further wrongs and further harms 
become more likely. (Radzik, 2004, p.142)  
Given this view, we can treat wrongful harms as actions that, on the one 
hand, cause injury or loss, and on the other, express a disregard for the rights of 
the other. Compensation must then seek to both cover the losses and negate what 
was expressed in order to annul the harm.  
 There is, however, an additional complication that follows from an 
expressive analysis of wrongdoing: the impact of such messages. In the quotation 
above, Radzik mentions that this message could affect the victim, spectators, and 
the wrongdoer himself and have effects that last long after the original harm. We 
have already mentioned in section 1.3 the possibility of rights violations affecting 
the self–esteem of the victim and that repeated harms might cause the victim to 
doubt their own worth and moral status. To this we can add the fear of being 
treated the same way in the future. The threat from the criminal is still there if 
the violator still condones his crime. Radzik again: “To wrong another person is 
to insult and threaten him. To do nothing (or fail to do enough) to correct that 
action is to allow the insult and the threat to stand” (Radzik, 2004, p.142). The 
wrongdoer might even take the lack of protest as an expression of support and 
make them respect such rights even less in the future. Then there is the impact 
on spectators who might be influenced by the criminal and take the victim’s rights 
less seriously. They might become more passive in the future when others are 
treated in similar ways. There are thus three dimensions to wrongful harms and 
to moral rectification: direct harm done to the victim (self-worth, fear and risk of 
future harms, and actual harm); effects on the wider moral community (respect 
for rights of others generally and respect for the rights of the victim in particular); 
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and the conscience and will of the violator (condoning or opposing his criminal 
act).  
2.2 Restating what is right. 
In the retributivist version, what needs to be done in order to reinstate the 
status of rights is to punish the criminal. And this punishment must presumably 
be such that it communicates to the criminal, to the victim, and to the wider 
community, that what has been expressed in the criminal act does not hold. 
Outside the criminal context, what is required is often some kind of apology. 
Compensation seems to fall somewhere between punishment and the informal 
repair of apologies.  
According to Hegel, the will of the violator is not only the cause of the 
violation of the right but also where the wrong “resides”, and thus it is the 
necessary object for punishment in order to achieve a negation of the crime (see 
Brown, 2001, for discussion).  
The sole positive existence which the injury possesses is that it is the particular will 
of the criminal. Hence to injure [or penalize] this particular will as a will 
determinately existent is to annul the crime, which otherwise would have been held 
valid, and to restore the right. (Hegel, 1973: 69, §99) 
For Hegel, punishment is meant to annul the crime insofar as the locus of 
the crime lies in the will of the criminal (Hegel, 1973, pp.69-70, §§98, 99). 
Punishment thus denies what was expressed in the wrongful action and re-
establishes what is right. Similar thoughts run through later expressive theories 
of punishment (see, e.g., Feinberg, 1970b; Duff, 2001, esp. 27ff): what is right is 
communicated to the criminal through an act of punishment to “reconnect him 
with correct values” (Nozick, 1981, 374ff) or to make him comply with the values 
of the community (Duff, 2001).  
 Where does this bring us with regard to compensation and the claim that 
compensation can right wrongs? Just as punishment is an action with a different 
message than the criminal act, so too can compensation offer a different message 
than the original wrongdoing. But there is an interesting difference. Punishment 
can communicate to the community and to the criminal the values of the state. It 
can defend the rights of the victim and communicate such rights to the 
community, to the criminal, and to the victim. But punishment is imposed on the 
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wrongdoer externally. Compensation, by contrast, can be offered by the 
wrongdoer himself. It can, of course, be something externally required of the 
wrongdoer. But it need not be. And even when forced, it can be offered out of 
genuine contrition. In short, compensation can communicate a change of heart 
where the wrongdoer now supports the rights of the victim. As an example, we 
can think of compensation to victims of earlier government policies that violated 
the rights of less protected groups in the past. The mere act of compensation 
signals a change of values: we no longer condone forced sterilisations, we ought 
not to have let insufficiently tested medical drugs be prescribed to pregnant 
women, etc. However, in such cases it would often be a later government rather 
than the original one that committed the violation. 
 We may now begin to address one of the objections to the strong 
compensation claim. The claim that compensation can only restore the harm 
done and not the wrong seems to overlook the expressive capacity of actions. If 
criminal acts and punishing acts can communicate then presumably so can 
compensatory acts. If an act of compensation could address both material harm 
and the moral message then we would have something approaching a supportive 
case for the strong claim of compensation.  
3.0 Apologetic and non-apologetic compensation. 
The preceding discussion raises a distinction between what we might refer 
to as apologetic compensation and non–apologetic compensation. To 
compensate someone non-apologetically is to offer money, goods, or services to 
repair damages or losses incurred by a previous act but not to admit to any wrong 
or to express any regret. It is often pointed out that this kind of compensation is 
insufficient to make amends for wrongful harms. Marshall (2001), Roberts 
(2002), and Lazar (2008) argue that compensation is insufficient and needs to 
be accompanied by an apology. Smith (2008) takes an even more pessimistic view 
of compensation. In a discussion of what he refers to as “compensatory 
apologies”, he claims that even when compensation is accompanied by an 
apology, such an apology “accepts no causal responsibility, admits no wrong-
doing, and expresses no opinion of the underlying value.” He continues: 
“Apologetic language may accompany such exchanges [of goods to the injured 
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party], but will typically commit to little more than expressing sympathy” (Smith, 
2008, p.149). 
 In contrast, I would like to introduce the idea of a genuine apologetic type 
of compensation. Apologetic compensation is compensation offered by the 
wrongdoer as a gesture expressing regret or remorse over the harming act and a 
desire to put things right. The regret and the wish to put things right are the very 
reasons for compensation. But rather than expressing this in a verbal apology, 
this remorse is expressed in the compensatory offering of goods, money, or 
services. It is acknowledging wrongdoing and expressing regret over and above 
any physical damages or losses.  
To illustrate the difference between the two, we can compare the following 
two examples. First, take the case of the Bullingdon Club, the infamous 
Cambridge dining club known to select restaurants to vandalise after the club’s 
annual dinners (Ronay, 2008). The club members supposedly offered very 
generous payments to cover all such damages after having trashed their eating 
venue. Considering that this practice was repeated over many years, the 
compensation cannot be said to express genuine remorse. This would be a case of 
non–apologetic compensation. (This would be so even if the compensatory act 
was accompanied with some verbal apology.) Compare this to a case where a child 
has accidentally broken an antique gramophone that they knew they should not 
have played with and offers their entire collection of seashells to the owner to 
make up for it. In such a case, the damages are far from repaired. However, we 
could easily accept the gesture as one expressive of regret, of responsibility for the 
harm caused, and of a genuine wish to never have done it in the first place. This 
would be a case of apologetic compensation.  
To the extent that the above examples have any intuitive support, they imply 
the following: 1) that there is a case for restorative apologetic compensation, that 
is, a case for compensation that repairs by expressing apology rather than by 
restoring loss; and 2) that full material compensation can be morally 
unsatisfactory when unapologetic. None of this should be all that controversial: 
in the private sphere of morality we offer flowers to make up for minor harms, as 
consumers we are often generously reimbursed for faulty products or mistakes, 
etc., and there is often a demand for apology when compensation is offered, as in 
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cases where wrongs toward certain groups in society have been committed by 
policies enacted in the past. Typically 2) would be taken to suggest a need for 
compensation plus apology. What I am claiming here is that there is an 
alternative to compensation-plus-apology that follows from the expressive 
potential of compensation: apologetic compensation. That a verbal apology can 
communicate an apologetic message is obvious. Here the claim is that 
compensation can be apologetic.  
At this point, it might be objected that it is far from obvious that there is any 
important difference between apologetic compensation and compensation-plus-
apology. If not, the defence for the strong compensation claim would fail, since 
compensation could not suffice to repair wrongs unless also accompanied by an 
apology either in the same act or as a separate act. We will return to this objection 
(section 4.1), but in order to respond to it we need to say something more about 
what a sincere and complete apology requires (section 3.1), how an act of 
compensation could be apologetic in that sense (section 3.1), and what the 
possible criteria for righting wrongs by means of compensation would require 
(section 4). I hope that, once we fit all these pieces together, the position that 
apologetic compensation amounts to something more and other than 
compensation-plus-apology becomes clearer. I also hope to clarify how apologetic 
compensation can repair moral wrongs qua compensation. 
3.1 Meaning of apologies: regret and acknowledgement. 
We will now need to say something about how an act of compensation could 
express an apology. It might be illuminating to say a few things about apologies 
in general. Smith (2008, p.80), for example, refers to the promise never to repeat 
the offense as one of the most important aspects of an apology.3 This is of interest 
                                                   
3 Smith’s (2008) account of “categorical apology” offers too thick a notion of apology to be of much help in illuminating the idea of 
apologetic compensation. He argues that categorical compensation, among many other things, requires both parties to acknowledge 
the same underlying values, the norms transgressed, and a shared narrative over the event. This seems to be too demanding for a 
general account of apologies. In most cases, it seems to suffice to acknowledge the reasonableness and entitlements of the other 
person’s perspective without sharing it. It must be possible to be apologetic across cultural barriers, across ethical barriers, and across 
language barriers. One of the beauties of apologetic compensation is that it can be expressed, and recognised as apologetic, over such 
barriers. I can realise that I have insulted someone by overstepping cultural norms, such as showing the soles of my feet to someone, 
and duly apologize for the insult and wish I had not done it without sharing those norms or the narrative. Out of Smith’s listed twelve 
criteria for categorical apology, several (1, 4–7) to some degree implicitly presume a common spoken language and apology as a 
discursive practice. See Smith (2008, 140–142) for a summary of all twelve points. 
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to us because one of the major objections to compensation as a way to make 
wrongs right was, as we saw earlier in the discussion about Nozick and Goodin, 
that it does not express any intention to refrain from similar acts in the future. 
The notion of apologetic compensation challenges this objection and rests on the 
assumption that, in a compensatory act, it is possible to demonstrate a will not to 
repeat the same offense.  
The second aspect of an apology stressed in the literature is 
acknowledgement, in particular acknowledgement of responsibility and of some 
kind of culpability (see, e.g., Gill, 2000; Govier and Verwoerd, 2002). Gill (2000) 
lists the following five aspects of an apology: 
1. An acknowledgment that the incident did in fact occur;  
2. An acknowledgment that the incident was inappropriate in some way;  
3. An acknowledgment of responsibility for the act; 
4. The expression of an attitude of regret and a feeling of remorse; and  
5. The expression of an intention to refrain from similar acts in the future. 
(Gill, 2000, p.12) 
A good place to start would be to assume something like the following: to 
the extent that an act of compensation can convey aspects 1 through 5 above, it is 
an apologetic act of compensation. Interestingly enough, it seems that all of these 
aspects can apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to compensation. Even a non–
apologetic act of compensation necessarily admits to some kind of responsibility 
for what happened and that it did happen (1 and 3), or else there would be nothing 
to compensate for. What non–apologetic compensation fails to communicate is 
an intention to act differently in the future, acknowledgement of culpability, and 
remorse (2, 4, and 5). Apologetic compensation should communicate all five (with 
the possible exception of 3 in cases where we compensate on someone else’s 
behalf, such as when one government apologises on behalf of an earlier one). This 
seems intuitively right, but on what grounds would we say this?  
As a starting point, I will propose three different aspects that could be 
expected to affect the apologetic impact of compensation either jointly or 
independently: a) the value or generosity of what is offered; b) the degree of 
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sacrifice or effort involved; and c) the degree of sympathy and understanding for 
the nature of the harm as perceived by the victim. There might well be other 
aspects, but I will focus on these three.  
a) Value or Generosity. In monetary terms, the Bullingdon 
compensation was more generous than the seashell offer. Furthermore, the 
Bullingdon compensation probably covered all the actual costs of the damages, 
and possibly more. Yet it does not convey nearly as much of an apologetic 
message as the child’s gesture. It could be argued that the child’s offer was, in fact, 
more generous in that it represented a much larger proportion of all their valued 
possessions. One could argue that, by a gesture of compensation, the wrongdoer 
is putting a fictive price on a moral trespass. If this is set too low, relative to the 
wrongdoer’s total wealth, then he has basically given himself an allowance to 
repeat the same harm as long as he compensates what he himself has decided is 
due. Thus, it is only when what is offered is so expensive to him that he cannot 
afford to pay it again that true regret is expressed. The child, according to this 
idea, would, when offering their only seashell collection, set a price on their 
trespass that they would never be able to pay again and thereby be taken to be 
expressing a genuine regret.  
This might be successful in communicating the message in one–off cases in 
the interpersonal case, but when it comes to a government or a large enterprise 
that might wrong others more than once, or more than one person, this way of 
expressing regret becomes impractical. A government might well offer such 
generous compensation as to never be able to make the same mistake again and 
still be able to compensate for it. The very idea of “total wealth” when applied to 
governments with debts and an income based partly on taxing its citizens is 
problematic in itself. This approach becomes even more problematic if we assume 
that any solutions for preventing similar problems in the future must be financed 
from the same source that compensation would be due from (i.e., the taxpayers). 
But perhaps the idea could be much simpler: an act of compensation can 
convey regret if perceived as generous by the victim (for whatever reason). In this 
way, we could leave it open whether the generosity is to be understood in 
monetary terms, or symbolically, or relative to the wealth of the compensator, or 
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relative to the wealth of the compensated. This is too vague to be of much 
guidance, but it is not obviously false. 
b) Sacrifice or Effort. An alternative solution would be to sidestep the 
idea of value and go straight to the cost in a more general sense, including costs 
in terms of time and effort. A common objection against compensation is that the 
wrongdoer might insure herself against it and be let off too easily (Marshall, 
2001). This could be interpreted as wrongs being permitted at too low a cost. But 
it could also be read in a different way: that compensation is emotionally or 
morally too cheap. If harm has already been insured against, then there is no extra 
cost involved in harming another, and the violator could remain detached from 
the results of his or her actions. In contrast, it could be argued that compensation 
can express apology when it involves some form of penance or sacrifice. Radzik 
suggests something along those lines: “A self-imposed punishment can 
contribute to reconciliation by serving as a further sign to the victim and the 
community that the wrong-doer takes his error seriously and is trying to 
recommit himself to a moral life” (Radzik, 2004, 149). She writes: 
  
Giving a gift to the person one has wronged can be a form of penance, 
especially if the gift requires a significant amount of effort or sacrifice from the 
wrongdoer. In other cases, the wrongdoers perform some service for the person 
they have wronged as a mode of penance (for example, after a quarrel with his 
mother a son may dedicate his weekend to cleaning her garage). (Radzik, 2004, 
144)  
However, suffering by itself does not necessarily make an act of 
compensation more apologetic. Adding a good portion of flagellation would not 
necessarily make monetary compensation more successful in righting a wrong. 
This could instead be perceived as something rather self-centred and morally 
demonstrative, directing attention away from the actual victim to the wrongdoer. 
On the other hand, there seems to be something morally disturbing about first 
committing a wrong and then helping oneself to great privileges. Thus refraining 
from gains one would otherwise have enjoyed might have something to do with 
sincere regret. (This seems particularly important in cases where there might be 
a link between gains for the rights violator and the harm done to the victim.) 
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Putting more rather than less effort into the repair could make the act more 
apologetic. Replacing the loss with money or what is close at hand is less 
convincing as an act of apology than going to the trouble to find something that 
is more significant to the victim, to find the “perfect thing” to heal the harm done.  
c) Sympathy or Understanding of Harm. The third option for 
conveying apology through compensation is to compensate in a way that 
demonstrates sympathy for the victim (Feinberg, 1970a, p.76). This would solve 
the problem of compensation being emotionally too cheap and yet avoid the 
charge of being too focused on the violator. The act of compensation would, 
according to this idea, express sympathy with the losses or injuries as the victim 
perceived them and try to repair these harms. This plays into the 
acknowledgement part of apologetic meaning: to acknowledge what happened to 
the victim as a result of the decisions or actions of the wrongdoer.4 The problem 
with monetary compensation is that in many cases it can be handed over without 
any such acknowledgement, especially if it has been insured for before the harm 
has occurred (Marshall, 2001). Money might be essential to repair what was done, 
but then the acknowledgement part could still be wanting. Perhaps this is the 
reason for the common requirement for an apology and compensation. But 
compensation can also be sensitive to the harm as perceived by the victim. In 
particular, replacement in kind leaves a lot of room for sensitivity to subjective 
harm. In many cases, things lost or broken carry more than one kind of value. 
Perhaps the broken thing reminds the victim of the place where he proposed to 
his wife. If such losses are to be compensated for, then it would seem that, even if 
all values lost cannot be replaced, they can all be acknowledged. If the place where 
the victim proposed no longer exists, perhaps some other memory from the 
wedding can be found. Even if the compensator were to be unsuccessful in trying 
to find the “perfect thing”, merely having put the thought and effort into it would 
convey an acknowledgement of the values that have been lost.  
4. Can Apologetic Compensation Right Wrongs?  
                                                   
4 Smith (2008) goes further: a genuine apology requires the violator and victim to share the same description of what happened. But 
this seems too strong. We can sincerely apologise for wrongs we commit against a value standard that is not our own. Perhaps the 
most common example would be overstepping the norms of a different culture and unintentionally insulting someone. 
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This paper began with what I referred to as the strong compensation claim: 
that full compensation is sufficient to right wrongs and to fully restore the moral 
situation for the victim such that it would be as if the original harm had never 
occurred. The most obvious problem for the traditional understanding of 
compensation is that compensation seems to only repair the material harm but 
not the moral aspects of the harm. This has commonly led to the idea that 
compensation is morally incomplete and needs to be supplemented with an 
apology. I have argued that compensation can, in fact, be apologetic and, in that 
way, also repair the wrong.  
 What are these moral aspects of harm? We borrowed Hampton’s idea from 
the retributivist justice literature that in some (criminal) acts the wrong consists 
of a message about the moral value or worth of the other. Or, to put it in Hegel’s 
cruder terms, the criminal or wrongdoer “lays down a law” in their act by 
suggesting a more permanent impact and influence on others. What follows from 
this is that in order for such a wrong to be rectified we have four aspects to take 
into account: 1) the message itself as an expression of the values or intentions of 
the criminal; 2) the moral impact of the message for the victim; 3) the moral 
impact of the message on the wider community; and 4) any material 
consequences of the act itself apart from the impact of its message. The first three 
would then constitute the wrong, and the fourth aspect would constitute the 
harm.  
 To what extent does an apologetic act of compensation need to remove the 
impact of the original message, and to what extent does it need also to repair the 
material harm brought about by the wronging? Compare these three positions: 
The Full Compensation Hypothesis: an act of compensation (provided by 
the wrongdoer to the victim for a previous wrongful act) can right a wrong if the 
previous wrongdoer compensates for all damages and fully apologizes for the 
whole of the wronging act.  
The Forgiveness Hypothesis: an act of compensation (provided by the 
wrongdoer to the victim for a previous wrongful act) can right a wrong if the 
compensatory act suffices to make the victim fully forgive the wrongdoer.  
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The Expressive Compensation Hypothesis: an act of compensation 
(provided by the wrongdoer to the victim for a previous wrongful act) can right a 
wrong if the message expressed by the compensatory act fully overwrites the 
message expressed by the wronging act. 
The underlying idea of compensation is one of replacement, or, rather, 
repair by replacement. It would then seem reasonable to assume that, whatever 
negative impact a particular act had, that impact must be “replaced” or removed 
in order to right the wrong. Yet the full compensation hypothesis is too 
demanding. It would require not only full moral repair but also that all material 
loss was fully replaced—with all the problems that follow. In many cases, this 
cannot be achieved. (There is also the additional worry over the need for double 
compensation: one for loss and one for wrong). For something like the full 
compensation hypothesis to hold, we need a weaker criterion for success than full 
repair of all harm. One way to do this would be to lessen the requirements for full 
compensation to a requirement to try to compensate as fully as possible. We 
could require that the compensator acknowledge all aspects of the harm and 
wrong committed and try as far as possible to rectify all aspects of those harms 
and wrongs. In such a case, it would be the trying that would right the wrong. 
This approach would still leave the question open as to when an attempt to rectify 
the impacts is sufficient to right the wrong. 
Alternatively, we could start with forgiveness and argue that a wrong has 
been righted when forgiven by the victim. Such an account would provide a 
precise criterion for when a wrong has been righted, whether compensated for in 
full or apologetically expressed in compensation. But forgiveness does not seem 
to be the criterion we are looking for either. First of all, the victim might not be 
able to forgive the violator no matter how apologetic the compensator is or how 
thoughtful and generous the compensatory act. Secondly, it would render all 
cases where the victim did not think herself wronged, or did not know herself to 
be wronged, problematic. Thirdly, the most serious worry about the forgiveness 
criterion is that there might be a complete mismatch between when a person 
actually forgives another and our moral intuitions about when they ought to do 
so. One person might simply never forgive another even for the slightest mistake, 
or else they might exploit the opportunity to demand unreasonably high 
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compensation. Another person might easily forgive even the gravest wrongs 
without the wrongdoer offering much by way of either compensation or apology.  
Instead, I think we need something more inter–subjectively accessible, 
something like a concept of “forgiveness-worthy” akin to “trustworthy”. I suggest 
that we assess compensation with the same criterion with which we assessed the 
wrong: in the message expressed. Does an act of compensation roughly convey an 
apologetic message equivalent to Gill’s list? Or is it a clear expression of respect 
for the moral rights of the other with an acknowledgement that a moral boundary 
was violated in the wronging act and that this boundary will be respected in the 
future? Is such a message one that could be understood by all that could see the 
wrong in the previous act? If so, then we have an act of apologetic compensation 
that could be recognised as “forgiveness-worthy”. Presumably, some acts of 
compensation will appear to us as expressive of genuine regret, a genuine will to 
make things right, a genuine acknowledgement of the rights of the other, of the 
wrong done, etc. I think we could reasonably claim that those acts also succeed in 
righting wrongs. Perhaps to make it more precise we could say something like 
this: an apologetic act of compensation rights a wrong when a sufficiently 
informed person (that is, one knowing about the wronging act and the 
compensatory act) would recognise it as a genuine act of repair that seems 
apologetic enough to be worthy of forgiveness by the wronged party. 
What then would such an act require? Essentially, compensation is about 
either a) making it as good as it was or b) making it as good as it ought to have 
been. We have mostly been occupied with the first part: making it as good as it 
was. This idea is rather straightforward when it comes to losses or injuries. I 
replace like with like when possible but in a way that is more generous: I put in 
more effort to make it right, and I am very sympathetic in understanding which 
values were, in fact, at stake. The object that was lost might mean very different 
things to different individuals. A broken cup might not just be a cup but also the 
only memory of a beloved grandfather. A random new cup would only replace one 
value. But, should the compensator find a rare cup precisely to the victim’s taste 
and seek high and low for some other memory from this grandfather to bring 
back, then these two acts would jointly provide a “forgiveness–worthy” case of 
compensation. 
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I now want to say something about “a return to how things ought to have 
been”. This applies in particular when policies or cultures have committed 
systematic wrongdoings against a particular group in society. Take cases like 
forced sterilisations, slavery, and all kinds of hospitalisations or medical 
interventions that are not medically motivated. Compensation for such instances 
of wrongs cannot make things right by offering a return to how things were before 
a particular act if those acts were not a deviation from the norm at the time. Here 
we must draw another distinction between historic cases and current cases of 
systematic rights violations and rights denials. These cases must be treated 
differently. In demands for compensation for historic cases of wrong, part of the 
moral work of repair has often already begun in the form of changes of policy, 
values, and legal rights. There might be no need for an act of compensation to 
express “an intention to refrain from similar acts in the future” because the 
enabling values have already changed. The demands for compensation must 
instead be understood as compensation in the form of acknowledgement of 
previous wrongs, acknowledgement of equal rights, and acknowledgement of the 
lingering impact such previous wrongs might have had  and continue to have. One 
such lingering impact might, for example, be the “invisibility” of a certain group. 
Such “invisibility” could be compensated for by greater representation, greater 
inclusion in history curricula, in honorary gestures like the naming of important 
institutions, events, and places, etc.  
When it comes to compensation for wrongs that express the existing culture 
of values, we might have come to the far limit of the strong compensation claim. 
We might even state the following hypothesis: only when a moral right is publicly 
acknowledged in society, whether formally or informally, can an act of 
compensation, when sufficiently apologetic and restorative, right a wrong 
between victim and wrongdoer. From this, it would follow that, when a moral 
right is not publicly acknowledged, then any act of compensation will be 
incomplete and that it can only right a wrong when such rights have been 
acknowledged on a larger scale. This hypothesis would limit the strong 
compensation claim to the realm of established rights. I think this might be a 
plausible restriction, but I will not argue for it here. 
4.1 Apologetic Compensation vs. Compensation-plus-Apology. 
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Let us now return to the objection raised at the end of section 3.0. This was 
the worry that there might not be any relevant difference between apologetic 
compensation and compensation-plus-apology, and that if apologetic 
compensation can repair moral wrongs qua compensation then so could 
compensation-plus-apology. I will address these two objections in turn. 
What motivates the category of apologetic compensation is that non–
apologetic compensation does not suffice on its own to repair moral wrongs since 
it does not address the wronging aspect (as argued in section 1). Furthermore, 
mere apology does not suffice to repair moral wrongs since verbal apologies 
could be found “too cheap” and without consequence. Both of these positions 
seem to be supported in the literature and intuitively plausible. What I also 
suggest is that the combination of the above two—a verbal apology plus a non–
apologetic compensation—would not rule out each of these worries in the joint 
case. An apology could still be perceived as “cheap” even if there was a monetary 
compensation added to it but there was no action to bring about any change to 
the moral situation. An act of monetary compensation could still be perceived as 
unapologetic even if the right apologetic words were spoken. In fact, in the 
Bullingdon case, it seems that both verbal apology and full monetary 
compensation was offered—but without acknowledgement of wrong. I think this 
“cheapness” is not so much a case of the absence of money to back the apology up 
as it is an absence of an action that expresses a genuine regret and wish for things 
to be different strong enough to motivate action that makes that believable. If so, 
then it does not seem to be the combination of two things—something towards 
the material reparation and something towards the apology—that suffices to 
repair wrongs.  
What I have argued is that it suffices to overwrite the wronging message 
with a compensatory act. This is then largely an expressive reparation. It could 
then be argued that it is the apologetic part that does the righting (and not the 
compensation). I think this is right. However, that righting could not occur by 
verbal apology. Rather, the righting must be expressed in an act of apologetic 
compensation such that one offers some service or good that expresses the 
intention that things be otherwise than they are as a result of the wrongful act. It 
is thus an apology that takes the form of compensation and alters the world in a 
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particular way that does the righting. A verbal apology could be added to such an 
act to make the message more explicit and less prone to be misunderstood; 
however, this apology would not, strictly speaking, be necessary in order to right 
the wrong. Is this still an act of compensation? I would think so, since what is 
offered is not so much a verbal statement as an act offering a service or good to 
the victim of wrong, which offering is deliberately aimed at addressing the 
impacts of a previous wrong (and which thus, from an objective point of view, 
would look like things changing hands, services performed, and so on). 
5. Risks, Rights, and Compensation. 
Should compensation be sufficient to repair moral wrongs, then this could 
have interesting implications for risk ethics (see Hayenhjelm & Wolff, 2012 for 
overview; for recent contributions see Kumar, 2015; Steigleder, 2016; Oberdiek, 
2008; and Ferretti, 2016). A problem that has received a fair amount of attention 
in the literature is “the problem of paralysis” that arises for rights–based ethics 
(Hayenhjelm & Wolff, 2012, for an overview, see also, e.g., Holm, 2017; 
McCarthy, 1997; Teuber, 1990). If there are individual rights not to have risks 
imposed upon one, then any action that imposes a risk on another would be 
impermissible. The problem is that many everyday activities impose a risk of 
some kind and would thus be impermissible (unless consented to). Furthermore, 
many risky activities affect anonymous others whose identity will not be known 
until harm occurs and whose consent cannot, therefore, be attained. Nozick 
(2006, pp.57-84) addressed this problem in Anarchy, State and Utopia. What he 
suggests is something like the following: 
 1. Person Y wants to do A, where A is an activity that imposes a risk R 
on X. 
2. Given that X has a right not to have risks imposed (no matter its 
probability or degree of potential harm), Y is not permitted to do A (unless X 
consents). 
3. The compensation solution is that Y is permitted to do A if Y ex ante 
commits to fully compensate X post ante for any harm that might result from R.   
Nozick’s suggestion seems congenial: we only correct harm when harm is 
done. Actions are not prohibited on mere grounds of what could happen. Instead, 
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it is the agent’s commitment to post ante repair that determines an action’s 
permissibility. For the tricky cases, such as those of small risks to large 
populations, this seems to be a promising way forward. However, this solution 
depends on the assumption that compensation can achieve full moral repair. I 
have argued above that compensation can right wrongs after they have occurred 
if they are sincerely regretted and come with an intention not to be repeated. This 
kind of compensation is not very helpful in terms of justifying risks for future 
harm. The only kind of compensation that can be offered before harm has 
occurred is a non–apologetic one. If the activity is controversial, this does not 
seem to offer a way out of consent. Non–apologetic compensation can perhaps 
offer a “good deal” that “tempts” a person to agree to a risk they otherwise would 
not have agreed to. But, on its own, it does not seem to justify risks. Thus, if we 
want to claim that impositions of risk constitute rights violations, then 
compensation cannot solve the problem of justification.  
There is another point worth stating explicitly here. “Imposing a risk” does 
not typically refer to an activity with the end goal of increasing the probability of 
harm (the often–discussed cases of Russian roulette being, perhaps, the 
exception.) It is, rather, another name for the pursuit of some good that also has 
the negative side effect of increasing the probability of some harm. The question 
of justification for a risk depends on whether that good can be pursued in a less 
risky way or whether it can be abandoned without increasing some other risk. We 
have presumed that “imposing a risk” would violate a right to not be exposed to 
an avoidable risk of harm. But we need to say something more about the nature 
of this wrong. It might be helpful to think of the variety of ways in which we could 
wrong someone with regard to risk in a more specific manner. We could introduce 
a policy that imposed a risk that was far higher than it needed to be in order to 
save money on safety measures. We could introduce a new activity that proved 
very useful but would bring about irreversible damage and severe negative effects 
in the event of an accident—and so on. Note that such wrongs would apply to 
everyone exposed to the risks rather than just those that were also harmed by the 
risk.  
Some such wrongs could be compensated for—apologetically—afterwards 
quite independently of any compensation of actual harm. In other words, what 
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seemed like a simple wrong of “imposing a risk” could be divided into two kinds 
of wrong-doing: 1) exposing people to a new or greater risk; and 2) bringing about 
actual harm for a few as a result. Both of these wrongs could be compensated for 
apologetically afterwards, but again, compensation could not justify them in the 
first place.  
But this is not the only function of compensation. Compensation can also 
redistribute the burdens and benefits of risks. Imagine a case where everyone has 
consented to a particular kind of activity as being worth the risks, but that some 
will inevitably be more exposed to the risks than others. Some individuals might, 
for example, live right next to a nuclear power plant and others very far from it. 
In such a case, we could compensate those that are more exposed and genuinely 
regret that we had to expose those individuals to more risks, but without us 
regretting the risky activity as such. To make such a partial regret sincere, we 
might have to ensure that other risky policies will not similarly expose those same 
individuals yet again and that there is an intention to let this higher risk be an 
exception. 
It seems that the primary role for compensation is to redistribute benefits 
and burdens of risk impositions: either to make the impositions of risk such that 
individuals would consent to them (if compensated), or to make sure that the 
distribution of risks can be considered fair (and those at greater risk due to 
greater vulnerability are duly compensated).5 This, however, is compensation in 
a rather different sense than that of righting wrongs. In other words, 
compensation cannot provide a general justification for risk imposition sufficient 
to solve the problem of reconciling risk impositions and individual rights. That is 
not to say that compensation cannot play any role with regard to the ethics of risk: 
it is only that such a role is more limited.  
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